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“May the world find convalescence in the German essence,” 
or “am deutschen Wesen mag die Welt genesen” – whenever 
a critic wants to comment negatively on Germany’s seem-
ingly having a mission in the world, one does not have 
to wait long for that ironic catchphrase to come up. Most 
recently it was used to condemn the promotion of German-
style austerity in Southern Europe. For a country that has 
wreaked global havoc twice in the last century, references 
to its Teutonic zeal should not be all too surprising. It has 
been forgotten, however, that the original author of the 
phrase, the poet Emanuel Geibel, was not referring to a 
German essence per se but to the German polity which, 
in Geibel’s time, was still a disparate assemblage of states 
whose unification would make Europe more peaceful, or 
so he hoped. However, its reinterpretation and use by the 
Nazis made the slogan infamous until it was used as a cri-
tique of assertive German foreign policy.
 Without knowing it, people in an unlikely place are 
currently working hard on Geibel’s rehabilitation. That 
place is Thailand. In studying how the German polity is 
constituted, and by adopting parts of it, the drafters of the 
next Thai constitution seem to be hoping for a transmis-
sion of Germanness to the Southeast Asian country. Their 
declared aim is to foster unity and peace. In March, a Thai 
delegation, headed by Constitution Drafting Committee 
(CDC) Chairman Bowornsak Uwanno, even spent five days 
in Germany on an official visit to examine the country’s 
electoral system, speaking with German Constitutional 
Court officials, among others.
 Ironically, the German constitution itself has only a 
handful of lines discussing the holding of elections and 
says nothing at all about mixed-member proportional 
representation. But the Thai visitors were impressed 
enough by that system to write at least 13 sections about 
it – spanning six pages (sections 103 to 115) – into the 
draft charter which is currently being deliberated. No 
wonder that, if adopted, the charter would be the longest 
Thailand has ever had.
A year after becoming a military dictatorship once more, Thailand’s new 
constitution – the 20th since 1932 – is taking shape. In it, the arch-conservative 
charter drafters stipulate that future elections will be conducted using a variant 
of Germany’s mixed-member proportional representation system. Their hope 
is that the resulting coalition governments will prevent future administrations 
from turning into populist one-man shows. The drafters may be hoping in vain. 
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nemesis of the country’s royalist old guard. With enor-
mous popular backing, the former business tycoon had 
started to side-line the military, the monarchy and Bang-
kok’s traditional bureaucracy as the focal points around 
which the Thai polity revolved. 
 In responding with redistributive policies to the 
growing material aspirations of the poor and of the lower 
middle classes, Thaksin posed a threat. With his wildly 
popular measures – such as a one-million-baht-per-vil-
lage program, an agrarian debt moratorium and a univer-
sal healthcare system – he exposed the vulnerability of 
King Bhumibol’s exalted position. The monarch had for 
decades been promoted as the country’s greatest bene-
factor. Thus promoted, the king’s charismatic author-
ity had been used in turn by royalists across the social 
spectrum to legitimize their own interests and agendas. 
In that sense they were “working towards the monarchy.” 
This carefully calibrated system of mutual support be-
tween the king and his followers was threatened by an 
imminent loss of royal authority in favor of Thaksin. And 
this is what antagonized royalists, together with Thak-
sin’s increasingly authoritarian leadership style while in 
office. It did not help him that he was also known to be 
a sponsor of Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, evoking the 
danger of the next king being linked with the Shinawatra 
family. With the king on his deathbed, control over the 
royal succession has become a factor in Thailand’s politi-
cal struggle as well.
 However, the coup that ousted Thaksin from power 
in 2006, forcing him into exile, and the anti-democratic 
maneuverings that followed were not enough to dimin-
ish his popularity among vast sections of the electorate. 
Hopeless attempts to criminalize and discredit him and 
to replace his policies with their own set of populist mea-
sures were made by royalists, the military, a dependent 
judiciary and the Democrats, Thailand’s oldest political 
party, which has not won a national election since 1992 
and hence desperately joined the anti-democratic, anti-
Thaksin alliance. These political plots notwithstanding, 
Symbiosis between King and Royalists 
under Threat
The detailed provisions are indicative of the paternal-
ism that was the driving force behind the drafting pro-
cess and behind the military coup that set it in motion 
last year. Thus, Germany and Thailand may soon share a 
similar electoral system, but not the spirit that underlies 
their constitutions. Where the German basic law stresses 
people’s basic right to protection against state oppression 
but otherwise allows for a certain degree of flexibility, the 
Thai draft constitution speaks a rigid language of mis-
trust of the country’s political leaders and the people who 
elect them. Its old and grey drafters tried to impose their 
elite perspective on how to run the kingdom in every de-
tail, as if a constitution alone could create desirable sub-
jects and their desirable political representatives. 
 This mistrust finds its ugliest expression in section 
172 of the draft charter, which allows for the appointment 
of an unelected prime minister from outside parliament 
if chosen by a two-thirds majority. The clause will be 
an imminent and ever-present peril faced by an elected 
premier, who must fear being replaced by an outsider 
through backroom dealings in the House of Representa-
tives. That outsider would have no popular mandate but 
the backing of Thailand’s royalist and military-adoring 
elites. Section 172 seems intended to ensure that a future 
PM does not stray too far from Thailand’s well-trodden 
paths of Bangkok- and elite-centric politics. There is also 
a chance that the provision will be used to extend the 
term of Thailand’s current dictator, Prayuth Chan-o-cha, 
or to propel into office another military-affiliated prime 
minister if and when elections are eventually held.
 The reason for all this is clear. In handpicking the 
members of the CDC, the military and its backers have 
exerted their influence over the drafting of a charter that 
aims to reduce the influence of former prime minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin and the proxies through 
which he has governed Thailand since winning the pre-
miership in 2001 – and every election since – are the 
3parties affiliated with Thaksin came in strongest in every 
election held since the 2006 coup, leading his sister Ying-
luck to become prime minister in 2011. 
 Her attempts at appeasement of the military and roy-
alists were dealt a blow when her administration clumsily 
tried to push an amnesty bill through parliament. That 
ill-advised move incited the anger of her backers and 
opponents alike. It seemed the Shinawatras had under-
estimated the yearning for justice among supporters of 
both sides of the political divide, who wanted to see those 
responsible for past violence and political crimes held ac-
countable rather than being let off the hook. The ensuing 
rage against the Yingluck administration enlivened the 
anti-Thaksin front again.
 What followed were months of violent street protests, 
an early general election marked by boycotts and the use 
of anti-government thugs to prevent people from voting, 
political meddling by the judiciary leading to Yingluck’s 
removal from office and, on May 22, 2014, a coup against 
the Shinawatra-affiliated caretaker government. The lead-
er of the coup, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, has enforced 
an eerie political calm since taking power. His govern-
ment is arbitrarily detaining people, dragging civilians 
before martial courts, rigidly applying the lèse majesté 
law to protect the monarchy from defamation, threaten-
ing reporters with death and enforcing martial law, which 
was lifted in April only to be replaced by section 44 of the 
interim constitution which gives Prayuth near absolute 
power to deal with unrest.
International Doubts about 
Thai Economy
It is important for politicians, investors and tourists alike 
to understand that Thailand’s dictatorship is far from be-
nign. It should not be given the benefit of the doubt. The 
present government has proven unable to deal with the 
many problems the country is facing. Instead, it is harass-
ing its own people. Since the putsch in May of last year 
690 people have been summoned for questioning, 399 ar-
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rests have been made, including 144 at peaceful protests, 
and at least 47 new cases have been filed to prosecute 
people for defaming the monarchy under the country’s 
draconian lèse majesté law, according to iLaw, a Thai 
NGO. Nonsensical orders have been issued after the coup, 
criminalizing the consumption of sandwiches in public, 
openly reading Orwell’s 1984, flashing the three finger 
salute from the dystopian novel and movie series “The 
Hunger Games,” as well as participating in walking dem-
onstrations. Under these circumstances the desperately 
needed open and inclusive discussion of Thailand’s future 
has been made impossible. 
 Tourists travelling to Thailand should bear in mind that 
they are visiting a country where the political opposition 
lives in fear and freedom of expression is suppressed. This 
makes relaxation at palm-lined beaches a little harder. Ac-
cording to the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), 
Thailand is already feeling the consequences (Figure 1) 
as it slipped on the list of international tourist arrivals to 
14th in 2014 from 10th the year before, with a total drop in 
arrivals of 6.7 percent. In 2014, Bangkok also lost to Lon-
don its spot as the top destination city on the MasterCard 
Global Destination Cities Index. Although the number 
of tourists visiting Thailand has started to rise again re-
cently, that is no cause for relief because the growth has 
mainly been driven by Chinese tourists who do not spend 
as much. Given that tourism makes up the equivalent of 10 
percent of Thailand’s GDP, this is bad news.
 It did not help Thailand’s popularity among Western 
travelers when Prayuth Chan-o-cha criticized tourists for 
wearing bikinis. His comments followed the murder of a 
young British couple on the island of Koh Tao in Septem-
ber 2014 – one of several cases of homicide on Thailand’s 
beaches that made headlines last year. In one of his infa-
mous televised speeches, Prayuth jokingly said: “Tourists 
think that Thailand is beautiful, safe and that they can do 
anything they want here. That they can put on their bikinis 
and go anywhere they want. I ask, can you get away with 
wearing bikinis in Thailand? Unless you are not beauti-
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
0
4
2
6
8
1
5
3
7
9
Thailand
Philippines
Indonesia
Cambodia
Malaysia
Lao, PDR
Vietnam
Figure 2: GDP data and forecasts 
for Southeast Asia
Source: World Bank
5 The international community shares these doubts. Im-
mediately after the coup, the European Union took steps 
to make its worries known by shelving its free-trade nego-
tiations with Thailand. Brussels’ move came at a precari-
ous time. After the departure of the country from the EU’s 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) this year and the 
loss of the corresponding tariff privileges, the conclusion 
of an FTA with Europe has become more pressing for Thai-
land’s traders. The EU is their third largest export market. 
The increased tariffs following the GSP cut apply to crucial 
goods such as automotive parts, meats, precious stones, 
rubber products, seafood and textiles. So far the EU stands 
by its post-coup announcement that no agreements will be 
signed with Thailand unless a democratically elected gov-
ernment is in place. But as much as European defenders of 
democracy might want to read this as a sign of Brussels’ 
commitment to human rights and democratic values, the 
motivations of the European negotiators are more complex 
and more mundane. According to a source in the Euro-
pean Commission’s Directorate General for Trade, the EU 
is mainly worried about the technical consequences of an 
FTA concluded at this point in time because a future civil-
ian administration might retroactively reject agreements 
made by an unaccountable military government. Behind 
Brussels’ rhetoric of democracy lies a sobering pragma-
tism. Be that as it may, the economic consequences for 
Thailand of the halted negotiations are real.
 As the largest investor in Thailand, Japan has also 
urged Prayuth to restore democracy as soon as possible, 
reminding him that investments could be redirected to 
regional competitors if the junta’s now shelved measures 
promoting economic nationalism were actually imple-
mented. Another vital foreign friend, the United States, is 
becoming more and more vocal about its discontent with 
the military government. On his visit to Bangkok in Janu-
ary, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel called for a more inclusive 
political process and voiced his concern over the suppres-
sion of civil freedoms in Thailand and the politically moti-
ful?” In short, a woman who decides to wear a bikini in 
Thailand should not be too surprised if someone tries to 
kill her; after all, it is her fault for thinking the country 
is beautiful and safe. Although Prayuth later apologized 
and stressed that he merely wanted to remind tourists to 
be careful, the damage had been done. The British press 
was already busy reporting on the tasteless joke the dicta-
tor had made in relation to the tragic death of two young 
people in the country he governs. 
 The tourist sector is only one of many economic flash 
points in Thailand. Under Prayuth’s leadership, a sluggish 
economy recovering at a painfully slow pace is being fur-
ther aggravated by low consumer confidence, which hit a 
nine-month low in March. 2014 hardly saw any growth at 
all. Exports continue to underperform, while investments 
were 20 percent lower in 2014 than the year before. And 
Thailand’s outlook remains grim (Figure 2). Measures to 
boost jobs and spending – like the implementation of in-
frastructure megaprojects, which Yingluck had been criti-
cized for but which were swiftly adopted and adapted by 
the junta itself – are lagging behind schedule. While the 
central bank recently cut its growth forecast to 3.8 per-
cent, Kasikorn Research Centre estimates even weaker 
growth of 2.8 percent. The country will most likely remain 
the region’s slowest growing economy. 
 Caught in a textbook middle-income trap, and with an 
educational system that stresses nationalist indoctrina-
tion and rote learning rather than the creative and critical 
thinking needed to move towards a higher value-added 
economy, Prayuth’s Thailand will continue to lose its dy-
namism to more vibrant competitors in the neighborhood. 
The dictator has made it compulsory for school children 
to repeat the junta’s twelve core values on a daily basis, 
among them upholding the monarchy, being grateful to 
parents and treasuring tradition. This orientation towards 
an imagined past does not bode well for Thailand’s future. 
The current skepticism on the part of investors and con-
sumers seems to confirm general doubts about the direc-
tion Thailand has been taking after the coup.
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constitution that was unveiled in mid-April was sup-
posed to provide more clarity, it has utterly failed to do 
so. Given the excessive number of checks and balances 
on the government that the constitution would establish 
if adopted in its present form, an effective administration 
of the country would become nearly impossible. The out-
landish “National Moral Assembly,” whose duty it would 
be to judge the ethical standards of politicians, is only 
one of a host of appointed councils that would meddle in 
the affairs of elected representatives. Together with the 
prospect of having an unelected prime minister, Thailand 
would become a democracy in name only, a development 
that is further exemplified by the composition of the fu-
ture upper house consisting of 200 senators, of which 
only 77 would be elected. A decade ago, the makeup of 
Thailand’s Senate was still fully based on popular will.
 The Germany-inspired mixed-member proportional 
representation system for the election of parliamentar-
ians is also intended to weaken the administration. The 
charter’s drafters were eager to prevent the return of a 
strong prime minister affiliated with Thaksin. Therefore, 
they looked into the electoral systems of other countries 
and found the German system to produce coalition gov-
ernments that are broad enough to dilute the agenda of 
any future prime ministers. Coalitions, they hope, will 
provide a check on the prime minister who will have to 
compromise to keep his or her partners in government 
happy. But Thailand already had its share of coalition gov-
ernments in the 1990s before the onset of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, none of which provided for effective gov-
ernment. Bickering, bargaining and defections were the 
order of the day. It is likely that Thailand will end up with 
extremely unstable coalition governments that will be 
hard pressed to get anything done.
 Moreover, given Thaksin’s lasting popularity, it is un-
clear if the new electoral system will prevent his Phuea 
Thai Party from winning a majority yet again. Of the 450 
to 470 members of the future House of Representatives, 
250 will be elected on a constituency basis and up to 220 
vated treatment of Yingluck Shinawatra before the courts. 
In April, the US even scrapped the meeting to prepare for 
the annual Cobra Gold military exercise held in Thailand, 
the largest of its kind in the Asia-Pacific region. Officially, 
the meeting was postponed, but the Thais were not given 
a replacement date. The move represents a further sign of 
disapproval after the suspension of military assistance to 
the Thai army and a previous downsizing of Cobra Gold 
following the coup. 
 Lately Washington seemed to send yet another signal 
by appointing Glynn Davies, formerly an envoy to North 
Korea, as its new ambassador to Thailand, pending his ap-
proval by the Senate. Some have interpreted the choice of 
a seasoned expert on crisis diplomacy as meaning that the 
United States wants to press the junta to return to democ-
racy. It would have been an even stronger signal, however, 
not to appoint a new ambassador at all at this point. But 
Washington is walking a tightrope between making its dis-
satisfaction with the military dictatorship known and try-
ing not to antagonize Thailand in a way that would push 
the country into the welcoming arms of China. In recent 
months, the junta has already tried to make its friends in 
the West nervous by holding high level meetings with Rus-
sian and Chinese counterparts. Deeper defense ties with 
China were being discussed while Russian Prime Minister 
Dmitry Medvedev visited the kingdom in April as the first 
Russian PM to do so in 25 years. Given Thailand’s long-
standing ties with the West, it is unlikely that such the-
atrical displays of diplomacy will usher in a fundamental 
shift away from its democratic partners. But they seem 
sufficient to deter Washington from getting tough with 
one of its oldest, yet most disappointing allies in South-
east Asia.
Draft Constitution Provides No Relief
Given the dire situation Thailand has maneuvered itself 
into, investors are right to adopt a wait and see strategy. 
The kingdom’s future direction remains unclear, its sta-
bility and predictability are in serious doubt. If the draft 
7 Yet there is another constitutional provision – sug-
gested by Lijphart and in use in Germany – that could 
heal Thailand’s wounds: federalism and decentralization. 
Although federalism was not considered by the CDC, it is 
important to realize that the political divide in Thailand 
is in part also a geographical divide. Wide gaps exist in 
identities and political preferences among the country’s 
regions and provinces, particularly between Bangkok 
and the South, on the one hand, and the rural North and 
Northeast regions, on the other. Attention should therefore 
be paid to Lijphart’s assertion that “for divided societies 
with geographically concentrated communal groups, a 
federal system is undoubtedly an excellent way to provide 
autonomy for these groups.” 
 Instead of creating a Senate of mostly appointed mem-
bers and, with it, another democratic deficit, it would 
have been worth considering the establishment of a sec-
ond federal legislative chamber. For divided societies like 
Thailand, Lijphart specifically recommended the German 
and the Indian models. However, given the deep-seated 
bias against the provinces among Thailand’s urban-based 
elites and middle classes, as well as the kingdom’s his-
torical Bangkok-centrism, the idea of federalism seems 
far-fetched for now. And yet, the disappearance of King 
Bhumibol from the scene and the disorder that will follow 
may eventually force the country to find a way to effec-
tively organize the Thai polity. Thailand may yet find con-
valescence in the German essence, which is federalism 
and fair competition among the states whose unification 
Geibel had called for.
through the party list. One of the drafters’ hopes is that 
the greater share of party-list seats will benefit the oppo-
nents of Thaksin, since his parties have performed better 
at the constituency level. Even though this may indeed 
lead to a slight weakening of Phuea Thai, it will most 
likely still win the party a comfortable number of seats 
in parliament.
 The draft constitution’s shortcomings aside, it re-
mains to be seen if the document – or a revised version 
of it – will be adopted at all, adding to the uncertainty 
surrounding Thailand’s future. After producing the docu-
ment in mid-April, the Constitution Drafting Commit-
tee (CDC) handed it over to the National Reform Council 
(NRC) for initial discussion. The CDC and the NRC form 
the so-called “five rivers of reform,” together with three 
other key bodies installed by the junta – namely the Na-
tional Council for Peace and Order (NCPO, i.e. the junta 
itself), the Cabinet and the National Legislative Assem-
bly (NLA). All of them can suggest changes to the initial 
draft, which will then be edited by the CDC until a final 
version of the constitution is handed over to the NRC for 
approval in early August. However, if the NRC rejects 
the final charter, it will be dissolved and the constitu-
tion drafting process will start all over again. Thailand 
could become stuck in an endless loop of charter drafting. 
Meanwhile, it would remain under Prayuth’s iron fist.
Conclusion
In a seminal article about the constitutional design for 
divided societies, political scientist Arend Lijphart recom-
mended proportional representation as the electoral sys-
tem most suitable to accommodate diverse interests. “For 
divided societies,” he wrote, “ensuring the election of a 
broadly representative legislature should be the crucial 
consideration, and PR is undoubtedly the optimal way of 
doing so.” And yet, as has been shown, proportional repre-
sentation may not be the magic bullet Thailand’s charter 
drafters have been hoping for. It is unlikely that it will 
help Thailand out of its political mess.
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